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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Android covers 80% of mobile market share. One of the major driving force behind the triumph of Android in mobile market is the ease of development, freedom of
customization and overall huge number of developer community. But, these features
comes at a cost. Hugely customizable features provided by android SDK creates security and privacy loophole in the total app development ecosystem. As a result, all
android app markets have seen myriad amount of malicious and junk applications.
To encounter this issue, Android has also evolved. It has incorporated new permission model, updated vetting mechanisms in app markets(e.g., [1], [2],[9],[16]). But,
malicious applications also evolved to nullify these effects and eventually has become
more and more sophisticated.
In recent times, researchers have provided evidence of collusive android applications where two or more applications can team up to conduct a malicious act (e.g.,
[5], [7],[13],[12]. This applications are particularly dangerous because they are seemingly benign from a single application perspective. Vetting mechanism or malware
detection mechanism for single applications will label it as benign but it can be a
serious security and privacy threat when it is in cooperation with other applications.
So, pairwise detection mechanism is necessary to detect such malicious applications.
DialDroid[6] and (IccTA+ApkCombiner and COVERT)[13] are such two efforts from
research community to identify collusive malicious applications. So far, researchers
are able to identify collusive attacks using different techniques but there are still few
questions that need attention. Prior research were able to identify automated collusive channels between different android applications but the degree of developers
involvement to establish such channels are still in the dark.
Android applications normally have many open interfaces. Though it is suggested
by research community to follow security aware coding practices, it is highly unlikely
that developers community follow them strictly. So, it is difficult to say weather
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intent base inter app communication channels identified by static analysis actually
intentionally designed by the developers. If we can identify developer’s involvement
in establishing collusive channels, we can understand their motivation, their point of
interest and gather valuable insights to design systems to vet these malicious activities.
Primary purpose of this paper is to develop a methodology to identify developers
involvement in collusive attack in two different android applications. To achieve
our goal, we take an empirical approach. At first we collect most popular android
applications from Google play and virusshare. Then we use state-of-the-art static
analysis tool to find data flow path in each application. We store these data in
highly normalized MySql database. Then we build a query model based on internal
mechanism of intent based communication. Based on our model, we run queries to
store collusive channels that required direct developer’s effort to build . Then we do
different empirical and statistical analysis to understand the motivation and nature
of these collusive channels.
Our results show that there are myriad amount of collusive channels are not established just by coincidence rather required developer’s effort. However, it is necessary
to mention that not all of these collusive channels are malicious. Some may be created
because of poor coding practices, some by just using same sdks across different apps
or just for using same code base for building different applications. We summarize
our contribution as follows:
1. We provide a novel methodology to deterministically identify developers involvement in establishing malicious channels between two different apps. We describe a
model based on internal implementation of inter app communication and present empirical evidence on the accuracy of our model. We open sourced all our data we have
gathered to build our model.
2. We extend the state-of-the art open source collusive data flow analysis tool Dial-
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droid to increase source-sink discovery rate to a great extend specially for large real
world apps. We open sourced our code, total implementation of our methodology.
3. We analyzed 1,36,012 applications using our updated tool using cluster computers and made our generated data open source. We also report various interesting
statistics regarding malicious exploitation of inter app communication channels.
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND
2.0.1 Android Components
Android application has four major components. Activity, Service, Broadcast
Receivers and Content Providers. These four components communicate with each
other with a message passing mechanism called Intent. These communication can
be between components of same or different apps. In this paper, we focus on communication between components of different apps. Every android application has a
AndroidManifest.xml file which includes all the components, permissions and other
necessary details for that specific application.
2.0.2 Intents
Intents are messaging objects in android which are used to request another application component to perform certain actions. During this communication, one app
can bind additional information to pass it to other application. App component can
be of different types. For example, one app can use intents to start a new activity
(new screen) or a new service (to run some longer running task in background). Intent has three major parameter string. They are category, data and action. These
parameters are used to choose the right component in response to a request. Android
use a technique called Intent Resolution for this purpose.
2.0.3 Type of Intents
There are two major type of intents. Explicit intents and Implicit intents.

Explicit Intents
Explicit intent specify which component to receive the intended intent. It is done
by explicitly specifying the package name or fully qualified component class name. If
explicit intents are used, only the targeted component is able to receive the intent. In
AndroidManifest.xml all application components are declared. For each component,
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AndroidManifest.xml a parameter called exported can be added. If this parameter is
set to false other applications can not directly invoke this component.

Implicit Intents
Implicit intents are intents where targeted components are not specified. Rather,
few parameters of the intent are added. Each component can registers for specific type
of intent via intent filter. Based on the properties specified in the intent, operating
system selects a set of component to complete an action.
Intent intent= new Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW);
intent.setData(Uri.parse("http://www.java.com"));
startActivity(intent);

In the above example, intent request for a component that can show a HTML
page. Intent also specify the url of the page to be loaded. There can be more than
one application who can perform this request. In that case, Operating system will
present a set components that can perform the action to user.
2.0.4 Intent Resolution
As implicit intents do not have a specific receiver, operating system has to go
through a process called Intent resolution to determine the best suited receiver component for the intent. Android uses three pieces of string from intent object for this
purpose. They are action, category and type. If action, category or type parameters
exist in the intent object, receiver component must include them in their intent filters
to be a valid candidate as a receiver of the intent. If there are multiple matching
component found for an intent object, operating system pops up a window and leaves
the choice of choosing an component to the user. Figure 2.1 shows visualization of
intent resolution technique ( source: developers.android.com ) in android.
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Figure 2.1: Visualization of Intent Resolution

Intent Filter
An intent filter is an expression in an application’s AndroidManifest.xml file that
specifies the type of intents that the component would like to listen to.
<activity android:name="ShareActivity">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="android.intent.action.SEND"/>
<category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>
<data android:mimeType="text/plain"/>
</intent-filter>
</activity>

In this example, ShareActivity is an application component. It only listens to the
intents that request to send plain text.
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2.0.5 Content Provider
Content provider is a secure way to connect data of one process to code of another
process. Content provider presents data to external applications as one or more tables
that are similar to the tables found in a relational database. Android provides special
security guidelines for content providers to make data sharing secure and structured.
A provider application can specify permissions that a caller application requires to
request data from it. Caller application must include them in ¡uses-permission¿ tag
in it’s AndroidMenifest.xml file in order to successfully retrieve data from provider
application.
2.0.6 Broadcast
Broadcast is a messaging system where android system or other applications can
send and receive messages. A broadcast message is normally fired when an event
of interest takes place. An application component can register for listening different
type of messages using ¡intent-filter¿ in its AndroidMenifest.xml file. An application
can send broadcast messages by customizing an intent by sendBroadcast call. For
example, a camera app after taking a picture can send a broadcast message about
the event. A gallery app upon receiving the message can update is database.
2.0.7 Source and Sink
Sources are Android sdk provided methods that returns sensitive data. Sinks are
the methods that creates interfaces for other application to red the data. For our
experiment, we use SuSi[3] project as baseline for determining sensitive sources and
sinks. A sensitive source can be getLastKnownLocation(), getDeviceId() to retrieve
any sensitive data. A sensitive sink can be java.io.OutputStream or java.net.URL
that create interfaces for other application to read that data.
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2.0.8 ICC Entry and Exit Points
In any icc communication there are two parties. Sender and Receiver. Sender
sends information using communication channels and receiver app receives and parses
that information. ICC exit points send a data to another applications using API calls
like startActivity(), startService() and ICC entry points receives that data using API’s
like getIntent(), startActivityForResult().
2.0.9 Effects of Security flaws in Android Application
Security unaware coding practices create quite a few vulnerabilities. One application can intercept the intent and set itself as an default activity, can receive
unauthorized data without user even notice it, can invoke an unauthorized activity
or service, forcefully intercepts a broadcast etc.

Activity Hijacking
Activity hijacking happens when activity achieves the ability of forcefully opening
itself. An malicious application can register many possible intents in AndroidManifest.xml for an application using intent filter. When a application calls for an activity
using implicit intent, malicious application will always be a valid candidate and with
little unawareness for the user, it can open itself instead of providing a full of options
to the user.

Service Hijacking
Service hijacking is similar to activity hijacking.

It happens when a service

achieves the ability of forcefully starting itself. An malicious application can register
many possible intents in AndroidManifest.xml for an application using intent filter.
When a application calls for an service using implicit intent, malicious application
can receive the request for service and starts itself. Service hijacking is potentially
more dangerous because it doesn’t involve any UI and it can go unnoticed by the
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user.
2.0.10 Privilege escalation
Each android application has it’s own permission set. So, an application can
only access information permitted by its permission list. But, cunning applications
can conspire among themselves to obtain sensitive information and distribute among
themselves which may lead to Privilege escalations. Privilege escalation happens
when a sender app receives a sensitive information using API call and pass this data
to receiver application via ICC where sender app doesn’t have the permission of requesting the data in its permission list. For example, one application has permission
of obtaining user’s location coordinate. If it creates ICC channels with other applications where receiving application doesn’t have location permission, it is privilege
escalation threat.
2.0.11 Collusive Data Leak
Collusive data leak happens when a malicious activity is distributed among multiple applications. When an application obtains a piece of information and leaks it via
an ICC exit point, it’s called data leak. Collusive data leak attack happens when this
data leaks happens with the help multiple applications. For example, one application
can obtain location information and pass it to it’s helper application using ICC exit
point. Receiver application can leak those information using ICC exit point to other
external sources. As data leak using single application is easier to detect, distributing
these activities among multiple application makes it harder to detect.
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CHAPTER 3 Threat Model
Our main objective of this paper is to identify sensitive ICC channels among
two different android applications where developers willfull involvement is required.
We define a ICC channel as sensitive channels when a data flow path starts from a
sensitive API call and flow thorough a ICC exit point to another application using
ICC methods. To define sensitive API’s, we use results from the SuSi project.
As we have previously stated, android application has four major building components (activity, broadcast receiver, service content providers). These components
from different application can communicate among each other to provide various useful functionalities for the developer. There is also a file called AndroidManifest.xml
where major components, their properties and application specific permissions are
defined. Though ICC provides tremendous usability and flexibility to developers,
poor developer practices can lead to privacy and security related threats e.g., activity
hijacking , service hijacking, broadcast hijacking [8]. These security threats involve
one victim application and one malicious application. When a single application is
involved in malicious activity, it’s easier to detect them using malware analysis. But,
researchers have found existence of more complex security threats where malicious
activity is distributed among multiple apps. In this paper, we are focused on two
types of security threats when malicious activity is distributed beyond a single application. One is collusive data leak and another is privilege escalation. To be able to
detect such application, we need to find all possible sensitive ICC channels from each
application to any other applications. One of the major challenges of analyzing such
security threats is runtime scalability of pairwise analysis ( each application needs
to be checked with all other application for malicious activity. Hence, it becomes a
quadratic complexity problem.
There is another inherent problem for analyzing such ICC base collusive channels.
Naturally ICC based communications are arbitrary in nature when communication
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is done using implicit intent. One application can fire an implicit intent using ICC
exit leak and there can be multiple application with ICC entry points to receive that
intent. It is also not uncommon to have ICC open interfaces in android applications
for poor developer practices [14]. These issues can dramatically increase number of
ICC collusive channels in pairwise-analysis. It can also detect a huge number of false
positive in detecting collusive channels ( one application can fire an intent with action
string Intent.ACTION VIEW to display an image, there can be multiple application
to display that image. In such cases, developer’s are completely unaware but pairwise
analysis can detect as collusive ICC channel). To encounter these problems, we
propose a novel methodlogy to identify ICC channels where developer’s involvement
is necessary to some extent.
We define six different ways of establishing communication channels using ICC.
Each of these communication channels required active effort from developer’s part
to establish. One very obvious type is explicit intent. Others use implicit intent.
We take away arbitrary nature of implicit intents and define each category such a
way each target component can be uniquely targeted even though communication is
established using implicit intent.
Threat type-V is communication channels established by ICC exit point sendBroadcast which includes both implicit intent and explicit intent. Threat type-VI is
communication channels established by Custom Provider. Threat type I, II, III, IV
consists of communication channels established by other ICC exit points (startActivity, startService, startActivityForResult with parameter variation in implicit and
explicit intents.
3.0.1 Type I: Explicit Intents
We have defined Explicit intent in previous section. In explicit intent, developer
explicitly specify target application’s package name and component name. So, if a
communication channel is established by explicit intents, it can be said that devel-
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oper’s are consciously trying to communicate with that specific component. A sample
explicit intent in android is called as follows:
Intent intent = new Intent();
intent.setComponent(new ComponentName("com.example.myapp", "com.example.myapp.
MainActivity"));
startActivity(intent);

In this example,

only MainActivity.class

of app with package name

com.example.myapp will respond to action requested by startActivity method provided a parameter exported is not set to false or permission parameter is not set in
AndroidManifest.xml.
To receive the intent, AndroidManifest.xml in the receiver app needs to be as follows:
<manifest package="com.example.myapp" ... >
<application ... >
<activity android:name=".MainActivity" ... >
...
</activity>
</application>
</manifest>

3.0.2 Type II: Implicit Intents with Custom Actions
Action string is one of the three fields used for intent resolution. An implicit
communication can be made explicit by carefully choosing an unique action string.
For example, sender app can use an implicit intent but uses a unique action string,
and the receiver app uses the same string in it’s intent filter. In such cases, sender
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app can directly communicate with receiver application even though explicit package
and class name is not mentioned in the code.
String custom_action = "com.unique_action";
Intent i = new Intent();
i.setAction(custom_action);
startActivity(i);

In this example, sender app uses an unique action string com.unique action in it’s
action field. If receiver app defines a component with an intent filter that filters with
that unique action string (com.unique action), intent will be directly delivered to the
component.
<manifest package="com.example.myapp" ... >
<application ... >
<activity android:name=".MainActivity" ... >
<action android:name="com.unique_action" />
</activity>
</application>
</manifest>

3.0.3 Type III: Implicit Intents with Custom Category
Category string is another parameter used in intent resolution process. Like custom action strings, developers can create intent objects in the sender app with custom
category strings and target specific component of the receiver app without explicitly
mentioning it’s name.
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String custom_category = "com.unique_category";
Intent i = new Intent();
i.addCategory(custom_category);
startActivity(i);

In this example, sender app uses an unique category string com.unique category
in it’s category field. If receiver app defines a component with an intent filter that
filters with that unique category string (com.unique category), intent will be directly
delivered to the app component
<manifest package="com.example.myapp" ... >
<application ... >
<activity android:name=".MainActivity" ... >
<category android:name="com.unique_category" />
</activity>
</application>
</manifest>

3.0.4 Type IV: Implicit Intents with Custom URI
Data is another piece of information that Android uses to choose the right component for an intent. Normally, an URI object contains the information about the
data to be acted on. Information can be location of the data or mime type of the
data. For example, if one app want to delegate the task of editing an app to another
app, the delegation process goes through an intent and intent object should contain
the location of the image to be edited.
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File fileToShare = new File("/sdcard/somefile.dat");
Intent i = new Intent();
i.setAction(Intent.ACTION_SEND);
i.setData(Uri.fromFile(fileToShare));
startActivity(i);

3.0.5 Type V: Custom Provider
Content providers provide ways to share data between apps. It creates a layer
of abstraction to developers to do complex data related tasks. Though for secure
communication, content providers have different protection level provided by android
operating system, co-operation between application developers can easily compromise that. Sender have can create custom content provider and implement appropriate callback methods to share the data. If developer of the collusive apps share
exclusive sharing credentials among them, receiver application can call the custom
providers without any arbitrariness and receive the data. To implement a custom
content provider, sender application extends ContentProvider class provided by Android SDK and implements all the callback functions. Server app also has to declare
the provider in the application manifest. Client application sends a request my class
that implements Cursorloader. A sample code is as follows:
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OncreateLoader(){
CursorLoader cursorLoader = new
CursorLoader ( this,
Uri.parse( "content://om.MyProvider"), null, null, null, null); }
onLoadFinished( Cursor cursor){
If(cursor != null){
if(cursor.moveToFirst()){ int val = cursor.getInt(1);
} }

A typical declaration code is as follows:
<provider android:name="MyProvider"
android:exported="true"
android:authorities="com.MyProvider"/>

Receiver app can call this custom provider to get the data and even listen to data
source changes in the sender app.
3.0.6 Type VI: Custom Broadcast
Broadcasts are a messaging system in android that are used to pass a message
across applications. Broadcast messages uses intent as a carrier. So, all the communication variants that are possible with intent, also possible with custom broadcast.
But, they key difference between communication of intents with custom broadcast
and other mediums is involvement of user interface. Broadcast messages doesn’t require any user action, it can be transmitted in the background. A sample code in
sender application is as follows:
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Intent i = new Intent (this,com.B.Receiver.class);
i.setAction("com.broadcast");
i.putExtra(data,12345);
sendBroadcast(i);

Receiving app registers for broadcast using a receiver app and listens for any
broadcast message. Upon receiving the the intent, it parses the data using onReceive()
method..
<application >
<receiver android:name=".Receiver ">
<intent-filter> <action android:name="com.broadcast"/>
</intent-filter> </receiver>

public void onReceive ( Context context, Intent i ){
int val = i.getExtra(data,-1);
}

Using the above code, sender can send a broadcast message to MyReceiver class of
receiver app without user knowing it. If receiver app properly declares that in it’s
manifest file, broadcast message will be seamlessly delivered.
Based on above type of communication channels, we define for type of security
threats related to ICC communication.
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CHAPTER 4 Research Method
Main goal of our study is to develop an automated process to identify developer’s
involvement in any malicious collusive channel. We take an empirical approach. On
a high level overview, we collect most popular android applications from Android
app market as our sample data, extract data flow path using static analysis, use our
theoretical understanding described in ?? to establish collusive path that requires
developer’s involvement and finally do manually investigation to verify our approach
and to understand the motivation of building such applications. We complete our
experiment in five different stages.
4.0.1 Tool Selection/Development
Success of our experiment depends on accurate extraction of data flow path directly from android apk files. There are few research tools available for that. For
our experiment, we choose Dialdroid, state-of-the-art tool for collusion detection in
android. Though, Dialdroid has all the features available to serve our need, we observe few key pragmatic limitations of this tool. Dialdroid fails in ICC exit and Entry
point extraction phase in many large real world applications. It has a timeout of 30
mins. But, for large real world applications (apk size more than 50 MB like Facebook,
Angry Birds ) this time limit is not enough. So, we implement a incremental update
feature in current Dialdroid implementation. After this update, Dialdroid is able to
save any data flow path it discovered before analysis timeout takes place.
4.0.2 Data Collection
Choosing right data source is extremely important for validity of an empirical
study. To validate our finding we collect data from most reliable sources. We collected
1,20,181 most popular android applications from google playe store from 24 different
categories. As we are considering malicious activities in android applications, we also
consider downloading 796 known malicious applications for virusshare. So, overall we
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Table 4.1: Categoty and Action Strings

action string
custom non custom
110251
571

category string
custom non custom
40474
232

collect 1,20,977 applications from 15 different categories.
4.0.3 Feature Aggregation
To understand security threats using ICC, we need to extract properties from the
source code of the apks. We use static analysis for this purpose. Feature extraction
phase consists of several phases.
At first, we extract Entry/Exit points from the source code. Given the apk file, Dialdroid parses the permission list and intent filters form AndroidManifest.xml.
Dialdroid use static taint analysis to determine ICC entry and exit points. To improve performance of taint analysis, Dialdroid uses dynamic precision configuration
technique. It has two different configurations. High Precision Configuration and Low
Precision Configuration . In High Precision Configuration, it uses a context sensitive
taint path of maximum length 3 and in Low Precision Configuration, it uses a taint
path of length 2. By default, Dialdroid uses High precision Configuration and if taint
analysis fails within a specified timelimit, it runs with a low precision configuration.
We analyze each of the 1,20,977 applications using Dialdroid. Analyzing this huge
number of applications requires tremendous computing power. So, we look forward
to high performance computing machines. The cluster computer was distributed over
40 nodes. Each node had Intel Haswell 2-thread 10-core chips with 64 GB memory
which combinedly provides computing power of total 800 nodes. We write Linux shell
scripts to automate our process and remotely submit our computation job over SSH.
4.0.4 Model Building
Major challenge of our study is to find properties of collusive channels that definitely proof developer’s participation in any collusive task over ICC. So, we take help
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Table 4.2: Custom and Non Custom Action Strings

Custom
com.distriqt.extension.notifications.NOTIFICATION
air.com.tinychat.mobile.intent.action.OPEN ROOM
aviary.intent.action.EDIT
aviary.intent.action.CDS DOWNLOAD START

Non Custom
android.intent.action.MAIN
android.intent.action.VIEW
android.intent.action.PICK
android.intent.action.SEND

from the internal mechanism of ICC communication. We study the documentation
of Android SDk and find the coding practices that must be present if developer of
the application consciously participate in the collusion. We described such criterion
in section ??. Easiest proof of developer’s participation in collusion is the explicit
intent. A simple matching of sink and source of two different applications using explicit intent proofs developers’ participation. But, to proof developers’ participation
using implicit intent is challenging. Implicit intent can be tweaked to target a specific component. In our previous phase of data aggregation, we collect all unique
category and action strings. Some of the action and category strings are provided
by android. For example, android.intent.action.VIEW, android.intent.action.MAIN,
android.intent.category.LAUNCHER. We manually label each category and action
strings as custom and non custom. Table 4.1 shows the summary of our labeling.
Some samples of custom and non custom actions are listed in Table 4.2
4.0.5 Evaluation
In data aggregation step, we collect data flow path of each application. We match
pair wise data flow path using their connecting ICC component. If we discover that
the connecting path is using any customized intent, we can definitely say that this
communication is under conscious consideration of the developer. Our approach
discover many collusive channels that require developer’s participation. We further
investigate the source code of the suspected collusive app pairs to extract additional
knowledge. We reverse engineer the apks and verify collusive app pairs and report
interesting case studies.
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS
In our experiment, we analyzed 1,36,951 android applications using our custom
ICC threat detection tool. Our tool saves extracted data in MySQL database. We
run different SQL queries to compute sensitive ICC channels. From our experiment,
we want to answer following research questions:
1. can we develop tools to determine developer’s potential involvement in Privilege
escalation and Collusion attack?
2. How prevalent is ICC based security threats in Android? Which kind of applications are mostly infected by sensitive collusive activity?
3. What are the possible motivations/reasons of establishing such collusive channels
?
4. What are the most vulnerable permissions?
5. What are top source and sinks methods of collusive channels?
In chapter 3, we described how developers can target a specific component of
another app using ICC even with implicit intent. While explicit intent is direct
proof of developer’s effort to build a communication channel, properly tuned custom
intent is also proves developers’ willfull involvement in establishing such channels.
We extract our data based on the methodology described in chapter 3 and calculate
the data leak path using SQL queries. As many of the queries involve multiple tables
and tables are quite large, we create multiple indexes for keeping the computation
time to a reasonable limit. We manually investigate data leak paths to determine the
accuracy of our tool. In all the cases, we find that all the data leak paths reported
by our tool is deterministic by our definition in 3. We explain most compelling
few cases in later sections. From our manual investigation, we can say that, it’s
possible to build tools that can identify collusive ICC channels where developers
involvement is necessary. We have made our data,tools and codes open source for
research community.
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Table 5.1: Demography

Category
Social
Tools
Entertainment
Personalization
Finance
Education
Communication
Medical
Lifestyle
Shopping
Photography
Transportation
Sports
Others
Productivity
Travel and Local
Weather
Libraries and Demo
Music and Audio
Media and Video
Comics
Business
News and Magazine
Health and Fitness
Virus

%apps
4%
4%
3%
14%
4%
4%
2%
1%
5%
2%
4%
3%
5%
22%
4%
4%
2%
2%
1%
3%
1%
2%
3%
2%
0.001%

%collusion
12%
8.5%
8.9%
28.84%
6.23%
7.88%
7.66%
7.6%
12.50%
6.73%
11.41%
8%
15.82%
13.60%
8.78%
10%
9.9%
17.35%
8.16%
7.78%
10%
5.7%
8.71%
12.8%
7%

% deterministic collusion
8%
1.8%
3.7%
3.12%
1.32%
3.5%
2.28%
3.83%
4.47%
3.52%
4.9%
2.63%
6.12%
6.11%
1.55%
2.94%
4.42%
4.63%
2.78%
3.2%
3.56%
1.7%
3.72%
6.07%
20.1%

% of privilege escalation
0.06%
0.33%
0.12%
0.12%
0.03%
0.15%
0.30%
0.2%
0.08%
0.02%
0.02%
0.04%
0.04%
0.23%
0.20%
0.18%
0.16%
0.10%
0.62%
0.15%
0.19%
0.11%
0.06%
0.09%
0.75%

5.0.1 Statistics of Security Threats in Android
We extract ICC exit and entry leaks using DialDroid as described in chapter
1:research-method. We also compute collusive data leak path and privilege escalation.
We establish collusive channels using the six methods we described in chapter 3.
In our dataset, we have found total 3,50,891 channels among app pairs. Among them
9,747 channels are collusive in nature ( receiver app leaks data using exit points). To
answer our research question 2, we analyze collusive and privilege escalation channels
for each of 26 categories. Table 5.1 shows ICC threats for each category. Category
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Table 5.2: Top source and sinks
source name
getLastKnownLocation
getDeviceId
getLatitude
getLongitude
query
getNetworkOperator
getConnectionInfo
getName
getSubscriberId
getLine1Number

percentage
15.5%
15.3%
12%
12%
10.4%
8.7%
6%
5.5%
4.6%
3%

sink name
startActivity
startService
android.content.Intent setAction
setResult
bindService
sendBroadcast
android.database.Cursor query
android.content.ContentResolver: int delete
android.content.Intent setComponent
android.content.ContentResolver: int update

percentage
47.7%
24%
8.1%
6.1%
4.7%
4%
1.7%
1.5%
1.4%
0.1%

Table 5.3: Top leaked permission

Permission Name
android.permission.ACCESS NETWORK STATE
android.permission.ACCESS FINE LOCATION
android.permission.ACCESS COARSE LOCATION
android.permission.READ PHONE STATE
android.permission.ACCESS WIFI STATE
android.permissionget.ACCESS WIFI STATE

Percentage
66%
8%
7%
3%
0.76%
0.18%

Virus has highest percentage of privilege escalation and collusive data leak. As these
applications are experimentally chosen malicious applications, it’s expected to have
high number of ICC treats. Apart from these, we persona
Table 5.4: Collusion in Android using ICC
Type
I
II
III
IV
V
VI

Name
Broadcast
Explicit
Intentional Data
Custom Provider
Custom Action
Custom Category

number of channels
84%
8%
4%
4%
0.1%
0.01%

Same Developers
97.90%
1.50%
1.7%
0%
0.0%
0.0%

Collusion
50.3%
47.9%
0.04%
95%
0%
0%

Privilege Escalation
88%
0.40%
1.70%
9%
0%
0%

Table ?? shows number of collusive and privilege escalation results we have found.
Collusion using broadcast is very prominent in number. As we have discussed, broadcast can be sent and received without involvement of user interface, it’s is heavily
used and hence heavily misused.
Table 5.5 sheds light on our first research question. It shows the existence of
security threats using ICC. Uses of ICC in android is prolific that even though the
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Table 5.5: Statistic on ICC exit and Entry Leaks

Exit leaks

Exit Leaks in Collusion

Entry leaks

Entry Leaks in Collusion

12,66,537

20,332

13,50,641

11,964

percentage of ICC exit or entry leaks participating in collusive channel is not large,
it can pose significant security threat.
Table 5.4 shows, summary of collusive channels we have found from our data set.
We find 3,51,941 potential collusive channels. Category Virus has most percentage
of vulnerable applications. It tops in security threats both in collusion and privilege
escalation. However, it’s quite natural because they are specifically designed to be
malicious applications. Apart from this, collusive data leak and privilege escalation
is prevalent in all the categories somewhat uniformly.
Then we investigate developers’ involvement in establishing these channels. Based
on our methodology, we run queries to identify developers active effort. We find total
9,747 collusive channels where developers’ active effort is required. We further do
empirical investigation to strengthen our claim.
5.0.2 Permission Leaks
Privilege Escalation is one of the motivation of a collusive attack. Malicious app
can receive sensitive data from other applications using collusive channels for which
receiver have no authorization for. Thus, creating a privacy hazard. To answer our
research question 3, we investigate top permissions that are violated by collusive apps.
Table 5.3 shows that location based permission are among the sensitive permissions
that are of interest of malicious apps. Though permission related to network information has incredibly high percentage of interest, our empirical investigation suggests
that they are mainly because of internet access related application flow control which
are not malicious and commonly used across apps.
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5.0.3 Top Source and Sinks
Source method is the starting point of a data flow. A flow starts form the access
point of an API. On the other hand, sink methods are the end point of a data flow.
Sink method can be the point where sender sends a piece of information to other apps
using ICC or to other consumer points like a network socket. Source and Sink tell a
lot about a collusive channel. Table 5.2 shows top source and sinks methods found
in our study. Our results suggests that information that can be used to target e.g.,
location, deviceId a user is heavily prone to collusive attack.
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CHAPTER 6 CASE STUDIES
6.0.1 Deterministic Collusive Data Leak
In previous sections, we described our methodology to automatically determine
developer’s involvement in establishing a collusive channel and provided results based
on our detest. In this section, we manually check few of the compelling cases reported
by our tool and try to understand the nature of those channels and motivation of
the developers. For this purpose, we decompile our apk with ByteCodeViewer and
investigate the source code.
6.0.2 Explicit Collusion:
Explicit intents uses specific component name to communicate with the receiver.
Our tool found existence of cases where sender app uses fully specified package
and component name for communication. This communication takes place between
com.floaters.search and com.newsflashapp.usnews. com.floaters.search is
the sender application and

com.newsflashapp.usnews is the receiver applica-

tion. From our investigation, this communication takes place because both the application uses same sdk. Sender app sends specific data using explicit intent. In
the receiver app, AndroidManifest.xml defines a broadcast receiver. Using the class
com.tooleap.sdk.TooleapReceiver, it receives the data and pass it further using sendBroadcast sink method. From our investigation, it we conclude that this communication channel is needed required developers involvement even though it is not malicious
in nature.

Location Data Leak
Location of an user is a sensitive piece of information. Our tool detect 3,857
deterministic collusive location data leak paths.

One of the app with package

com.team4win.tugroom that offers room searching facility at a university campus.
This app doesn’t have any permissions to retrieve location, but still it listens to
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any incoming intent with data scheme geo and any url set to maps.google.com.
Upon receiving data from intent, it calls an ICC sink statActivityForResult().
Our tool detect an app with package name com.comdataclc.hotellocator.android
as an potential sender for this app.

Sender app obtains Location data using

¡android.location.LocationManager: android.location.Location getLastKnownLocation(java.lang.String) api call. After a click event on a button, sender app calls
stratActivity with custom intent which contains location data.
6.0.3 Collusive Data Leak Using Libraries
Android ecosystem provides many libraries to provide different facilities to the developers. Many of these libraries are used by many popular applications. Our tool find
many of these applications that uses same library contribute to collusive data leaks.
We observe that two applications with package name com.clc.hotellocator.android
and com.homelessdevelopers.fue. Like the previous case, sender app send data
by customizing the data parameter of the intent. Upon receiving the intent in MainActivity class, receiver app sends location the data over email.
cl.movistar.android and net.bluumi.ForempFormacion uses a library provided by
xtify. These library internally uses ICC communication channels with same parameters. As same library is used across applications, collusive data leak paths are created
where one client application can listen to other client applications communications.

Deterministic collusion using Custom Provider
Our results shows that 95% of total deterministic collisions uses custom provider.

We manually investigate most compelling apis that are sub-

ject to collusive attack.

com.creativemobile.dr4x4 - com.facebook.katana ,

com.kimtips.app - com.facebook.katana :

Both of these applications calls an-

droid.telephony.TelephonyManager: java.lang.String getSubscriberId() api
using custom provider sends the information to com.facebook.katana. Upon Receiv-
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ing this information , facebook app starts a service which leads to collusion attack. We
find similar pattern in android.net.wifi.WifiInfo: java.lang.String getSSID()
and android.telephony.TelephonyManager: java.lang.String getSimOperatorName() as deterministic collusive attack.
6.0.4 Same Developer Collusion
Collusion using ICC mostly depends on effective contract between components
of applications. When developer of all participants app are same, it is easier to
create these contracts. So, we specifically investigate existence of collusion between
same developer app pairs. One such pair is com.pd.gsapro and com.pd.golfapp.
Sender application sends data using broadcast like any another collusive channels and
receiver application upon receiving leaks the data. But we observe that almost all of
this collusion stems from the fact that they use almost same third party library. As
these libraries use same action strings for communication, we creates collusive leak.
Even though these leak paths may not be designed to leak the data, it can be easily
exploited and far from security aware practice.
We

also

observe

similar

effect

in

same

developer

com.mobipath.ailemnerede and com.mobipath.caminerede.

app

pair

We observe

there is a collusive path that leaks deviceId. After, further investigation we observe
that this collusive path exists because both of these application uses same paypal
library for some of it’s functionality.
6.0.5 Privilege Escalation
Privilege escalation is a classic example of collusive attack. We have found quite
e few interesting cases of privilege escalation.

Location Escalation
Location is an important piece of information. Android application requires two
different set of permissions. One is ACCESS COARSE LOCATION and another is
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.ACCESS FINE LOCATION. android.permission.ACCESS FINE LOCATION permissions allows to access location from both gps and network provider while
ACCESS COARSE LOCATION allows only access to network provider.

We

have found total 2550 communication channels where there is potential scope
of privilege escalation using location data.

We find that an application

com.ichueca.pebblealarm retrives location data both from gps and network
provider with necessary permissions. Then it sends the data using broadcast using custom intent com.getpebble.action.SEND NOTIFICATION . We observe
that receiver application registers a receiver with same action in its intent filter. Receiver application com.matejdro.pebblenotificationcenter doesn’t have the android.permission.ACCESS FINE LOCATION permission to acquire accurate location but using the communication channel it is receiving the data which leads to
privilege escalation.

DeviceID Escalation
Android deviceId is an important information to target an user phone. DeviceId is also an integral part of push notification based advertisement system. An
application requires permission ”android.permission.READ PHONE STATE” to retrieve this value. We have found few communication channels where this information
is potentially delivered to unauthorized application. One popular application with
package name com.acme.android.powermanager acquire required permissions for
retrieving battery information including deviceId and saves it as a text file in external storage. After that, it sends a system wise broadcast message with custom
action. Another application com.iridium.mailandweb registers that action using
intent filter where it can easily read the unauthorized data from external storage.
In this communication channel no direct data is transferred rather a middle layer is
created and just signal of new data is passed.
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION
In this study, our main focus is to develop methods to determine developers involvement in collusive attack. We collected a significant number of applications and
generated a good amount of data to empirically justify our findings. our results show
that it is possible to determine developers involvement in creating collusive channels
among apps with acceptable accuracy. But, there are few limitation that will require further research. For example, currently we can determine active participation
of developers to create ICC channels, but it’s hard to say that they are definitely
malicious.
Our novel methodoloy can dramatically decrease false positive in identifying collusive channels ( any ICC channel that are created arbitrarily are not collusive). A
big part of increasing accuracy of our model relies on safely identifying custom action
and category strings. Though we have developed our custom list of action and category list, it can be further refined. For example, many popular sdk (e.g., firebase,
urbanairship ) uses some custom strings. If they are used in multiple applications,
they will be detected as collusive channels.
We have found that many of the collusive threats we have discovered are mostly
due to poor development practices. Google provides guidelines about secure coding
practices in intent based communication. In Case studies 6 we talked about collusive
data leak path due to using same libraries across. We observe that in many of the
popular libraries use the same security unaware code.
Intent localIntent = new Intent("com.some-action");
localIntent.putExtra("text", "sometext");
sendBroadcast(localIntent);

We find the exact similar code snippet in myriad amount of applications during
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our manual investigation. This code snippet seems apparently benign, but when
used across applications, it can create collusive path because broadcast sent by SDk
method call sendBroadcast() is transmitted across applications. So, other application
can listen to it. Android documentation provides safer way to send intra-app ICC
using LocalBroadcastmanager, but our investigation says that this practice is rare
among developers.
LocalBroadcastManager localBroadcastManager = LocalBroadcastManager.getInstance
(context);
Intent localIntent = new Intent("com.some-action");
localIntent.putExtra("text", "sometext");
localBroadcastManager.sendBroadcast(localIntent);

To mitigate the application level security issues using collusion it is required to
improve developer’s knowledge about secure coding styles. IDE’s acan also be made
security aware.For example, exported or permission parameter can be integrated as
auto-fill in Android Studio. Thus, developer’s can be more informed about secure
coding practices.
We have found existence of Privilege escalation in our dataset. We also suggest
structural changes in Android sdk to overcome this threat. Like permission parameter in AndroidManifest.xml is used to control access to a component from other app.
It can limit how a certain component can can called from other app (e.g., startActivity(), startActiityForResult(). A similar strategy can be used for ICC regarding data
transfer.
One concern with this method is maintaining scalability and deployablity of the
proposed technique. If we want to deploy this system for real world use, we have
to maintain a large database. Though using proper query planning and indexing, it
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should be able to process very large amount of data, for further improvement we can
introduce machine learning base technique.
Validity of this method heavily depends on careful selection of sensitive API. We
primarily choose our sensitive API from SuSi project. To increase speed of calculation,
we choose only the most sensitive ones. To increase the depth of the analysis, complete
sensitive api list can be used.
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CHAPTER 8 RELATED WORK
ICC security has always been challenged by security researchers since its birth.
Researches on ICC security can be divided into two types. In early days, researchers
were concerned about single application security analysis. Over the years, sophisticated application level security threats are discovered and researchers have also
investigated possibility of developing salable tools to nullify those threats. Two techniques are employed by researchers to analysis security threats. Static analysis and
Dynamic Analysis.
Comdroid[8] is the first complete study on ICC security vulnerabilities in android.
It is a single app analysis technique which focused on component hijacking threats
(e.g., activity hijacking, broadcast theft) 2. But, as it is a single app analysis technique,
it suffers from high number of false positives. Droidsafe[11] and AmanDroid [18]
are two solutions that uses static analysis for finding ICC threats in single app.
TainDroid[10] is a dynamic analysis technique for single application to detect privacy
leaks.Though these are comprehensive studies on ICC security, pairwise app analysis
is required to increase accuracy and to understand the overall security landscape.
Researchers have used both static and dynamic analysis for pairwise app
analysis. XmanDroid[7] was the first attempt of dynamic analysis in this regard.
FlaskDroid[17] is dynamic analysis tool for collusive threat and privilege escalation
detection. However, these dynamic analysis techniques had few limitations. They
were not scalable and only works for small dataset.

DialDroid[6] uses static analysis and relational database to build a scalable solution for pairwise app analysis. It establishes collusive channels from sender application
to receiver application using dataflow analysis to find collusive threats among apps.
But this approach is more generalized and can not tell about degree of developer’s
involvement in establishing such channels. PRIMO[15] is another project that uses
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probabilistic models to build sensitive ICC channels for providing complementary
information on pairwise ICC threats.
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CHAPTER 9 THREATS TO VALIDITY
In this study, our main focus is to develop methods to determine developers involvement in collusive attack. We collected a significant number of applications and
generated a good amount of data to empirically justify our findings. our results show
that it is possible to determine developers involvement in creating collusive channels
among apps with acceptable accuracy. But, there are few limitation that will require further research. For example, currently we can determine active participation
of developers to create ICC channels, but it’s hard to say that they are definitely
malicious.
Our novel methodoloy can dramatically decrease false positive in identifying collusive channels ( any ICC channel that are created arbitrarily are not collusive). A
big part of increasing accuracy of our model relies on safely identifying custom action
and category strings. Though we have developed our custom list of action and category list, it can be further refined. For example, many popular sdk (e.g., firebase,
urbanairship ) uses some custom strings. If they are used in multiple applications,
they will be detected as collusive channels.
We have found that many of the collusive threats we have discovered are mostly
due to poor development practices. Google provides guidelines about secure coding
practices in intent based communication. In Case studies 6 we talked about collusive
data leak path due to using same libraries across. We observe that in many of the
popular libraries use the same security unaware code.
Intent localIntent = new Intent("com.some-action");
localIntent.putExtra("text", "sometext");
sendBroadcast(localIntent);

We find the exact similar code snippet in myriad amount of applications during
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our manual investigation. This code snippet seems apparently benign, but when
used across applications, it can create collusive path because broadcast sent by SDk
method call sendBroadcast() is transmitted across applications. So, other application
can listen to it. Android documentation provides safer way to send intra-app ICC
using LocalBroadcastmanager, but our investigation says that this practice is rare
among developers.
LocalBroadcastManager localBroadcastManager = LocalBroadcastManager.getInstance
(context);
Intent localIntent = new Intent("com.some-action");
localIntent.putExtra("text", "sometext");
localBroadcastManager.sendBroadcast(localIntent);

To mitigate the application level security issues using collusion it is required to
improve developer’s knowledge about secure coding styles. IDE’s acan also be made
security aware.For example, exported or permission parameter can be integrated as
auto-fill in Android Studio. Thus, developer’s can be more informed about secure
coding practices.
We have found existence of Privilege escalation in our dataset. We also suggest
structural changes in Android sdk to overcome this threat. Like permission parameter in AndroidManifest.xml is used to control access to a component from other app.
It can limit how a certain component can can called from other app (e.g., startActivity(), startActiityForResult(). A similar strategy can be used for ICC regarding data
transfer.
One concern with this method is maintaining scalability and deployablity of the
proposed technique. If we want to deploy this system for real world use, we have
to maintain a large database. Though using proper query planning and indexing, it
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should be able to process very large amount of data, for further improvement we can
introduce machine learning base technique.
Validity of this method heavily depends on careful selection of sensitive API. We
primarily choose our sensitive API from SuSi project. To increase speed of calculation,
we choose only the most sensitive ones. To increase the depth of the analysis, complete
sensitive api list can be used.
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CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we only focus on intentional icc communication channels . But there
are few other ways to initiate a collusive privilege escalation attack. For example,
one app can store data in external file system in plain text or in encrypted form and
other app having the knowledge of location of the file and keys in case of encrypted
text can obtain sensitive information. In our future study, we want to explore these
areas.
Kotlin is Java alternative as a primary development language for Android. It is
getting popular among the developer community. As Kotlin is also a JVM language,
we plan to extend our tool for application developed i Kotlin.
Android wear is getting popular among android user base. Developers are trying to
combine features from different wearable and provide users with unique experiences.
To provide functionalists among different applications distributed across devices requires inter application communications. We also plan to explore this area of wearable
gadgets for security threats.
We also wish to customize our tool to make it mass deployable. We want to create
a rich of database of malicious coding practices in android community. So that, we
can develop future tools to refrain developers from pushing security unaware codes
in production.
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Security threats using intent based inter component communication (ICC) channels in Android are under constant scrutiny of software engineering researchers[1], [2]
[4][8]. Though prior research provides empirical evidence on the existence of collusive
communication channels in popular android apps, little is known about developers’
willful involvement and motivation to exploit these channels.

To shed light on

this matter, in this paper we devised a novel methodology to deterministically identify developers’ involvement in establishing collusive inter app communication channels. We incorporate static analysis and relational database technology to discover
sensitive collusive channels and domain knowledge of the Android SDK to build a
model to identify deterministic inter component channels between two different apps.
Our results provide empirical evidence that a properly tuned model built on internal mechanism of intent based communication can accurately determine developers’
potential involvement in establishing malicious communication channels. We also report various intriguing statistics, performance improvement of state-of-the art ICC
resolution/data-flow analysis tool and interesting case studies regarding developers
involvement in sensitive collusive inter app communication.

43
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT
Tanzeer Hossain
EDUCATION
• Masters Candidate (Computer Science)
Wayne State University, Detroit, MI, USA
• Bachelor of Science (Computer Science and Engineering), 2016
Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, Dhaka

